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Abstract:  
 
Deriving from the former internal market Commissioner McCreevy’s statement that the internal 
market needs to become more decentralised, the article explores to what degree the de minimis rule 
applies or should apply to the internal market, discussing in the process the advantages and 
disadvantages of the transfer of this rule from the field of competition to the internal market law. 
Although there are some conceptual as well as practical problems related to the application of the de 
minimis rule to fundamental freedoms, the author concludes that in the field of the internal market 
law the de minimis rule increases the autonomy of national authorities thereby strengthening 
democratic decision-making in the EU which is conceived as a multi-level governance system. 
Through this rule the Member States preserve their competence in the domain of market law with 
respect to rules which do not formally discriminate between domestic and foreign goods, people and 
services, the aim of which is not to regulate trade between Member States and whose restrictive effects 
on the internal market are too uncertain and too indirect for the measure to present a breach of the 
TFEU. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over fifty years after the goal of a common market was determined in the Rome Treaty and 
twenty years after the deadline for its completion, as established in the Single European Act, 
the European Union (hereinafter EU) is discussing the future of its internal market, which is 
seen as the main economic leverage of the EU. With respect to the future development of 
the internal market the former internal market Commissioner McCreevy made an 
interesting statement in his speech in Sophia in 2007 by saying that ‘we need to accept that 
the nature of the game has changed. […] The Single Market must become more 
decentralised […]. We need to improve the ownership in the Member States. And we must 
strengthen cooperation between the national and EU level’.1 On the other hand, the 
Commission found in the Single Market Act, adopted in 2011, that the growth potential of 
the internal market has not been fully exploited yet.2 On the basis of the latter, as well as on 
the basis of other recent internal market documents, it may be concluded that the aim of the 
Commission is no longer to adopt a great deal of new market legislation, but to assure a 
more legitimate and effective internal market, where the Member States will play a (an 
important) part in the creation of market regulation and will furthermore enforce it in cases 
of restrictions.3 
 
The main objective of the article is to examine how the de minimis rule might contribute to 
both abovementioned goals of the future regulation of the EU internal market – ie 
legitimacy and effectiveness. According to the de minimis rule, should it be recognised in the 
field of the internal market, only measures (of the Member States and private entities) which 
significantly hinder the functioning of the internal market would be prohibited, while 
measure that do not would stay within the bounds of national autonomy. Despite such 
advantages of the de minimis rule, its application in the field of the internal market is all but 
simple. 
 
The article compares the internal market provisions, where the de minimis rule is quasi 
absent, with some other EU legal fields, where the de minimis rule is applied. In this respect 
the article explores the general characteristics and functions of the de minimis rule, its 
current application in the field of EU competition law and public procurement and also 
discusses the application of this rule to the field of internal market freedoms. It points out 
internal market judgments in which the application of the de minimis rule was rejected, as 
well as a growing number of the EU Court's decisions ruling quite the opposite. On the 
basis of theoretical commentaries on this rule the article discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of the potential application of this rule to the field of the internal market. 
 
2. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DE MINIMIS RULE ACROSS LEGAL 
DISCIPLINES 
 
The de minimis rule derives from Roman law and has two meanings: a procedural and a 
substantive one. The procedural aspect is derived from the ‘de minimis non curat praetor’ 
principle, in accordance with which the praetor does not concern himself with trifles. 
                                                          
1 Charlie McCreevy, ‘The Future of the Single Market’, (Sofia University, 14 May 2007) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/308&format=HTML&aged=1&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en> accessed 16 June 2013. 
2 ‘Twelve Projects for the 2012 Single Market: Together for New Growth’ Press Release, IP/10/1390. 
3 See eg Commission staff working document; accompanying document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council laying down procedures relating to the application of certain national
technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another Member State, impact assessment, SEC(2007)112. 
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Consequently, court proceedings do not deliberate about unimportant or petty matters. In 
such cases the court dismisses the claim or decides in a simplified proceeding intended for 
the so-called ‘bagatelle’ disputes.4 In this sense the de minimis rule is recognised world-wide. 
The European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR), for example, held in 2010 in Korolev v 
Russia5, where the applicant complained about the failure of Russian authorities to pay him 
the 22.50 roubles (0.56 EUR), that applications are inadmissible where ‘the applicant has 
not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the 
Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the 
merits’. Similarly, in Bock v Germany6, the applicant, a civil servant with a monthly salary of 
4,500 EUR, asked to be reimbursed for a part of the costs, namely 7.99 EUR, which he paid 
for magnesium tablets prescribed by his physician. Due to the length of the proceedings, the 
case reached the ECtHR, which evoked the de minimis rule by claiming: ‘The Court shall 
declare inadmissible any individual application (…) which it considers (…) an abuse of the 
right of application.’ The de minimis rule enables the Court to dispose more rapidly of 
unmeritorious cases and to focus on its key role of providing legal protection of human 
rights at the European level.7 In a similar sense this rule is also recognised in the courts of 
common law, where it is known through the maxim ‘the law does not concern itself with 
trifles’.8 In this respect the rule was used by the English Judge Lord Stowell already in 1818 
in the Reward case9, where he held:  
 
The law permits the qualification implied in the ancient maxim De minimis non curat lex. 
Where there are irregularities of very slight consequence, it does not intend that the 
infliction of penalties should be inflexibly severe. If the deviation were a mere trifle, which, if 
continued in practice, would weigh little or nothing on the public interest, it might properly 
be overlooked. 
 
Similar interpretations of the rule can be found in the case law of the US courts.10 
 
On the other hand, the substantive meaning of the rule appears from the maxim ‘de minimis 
non curat lex’, ie the law does not concern itself with trifles.11 Consequently, only matters of 
wider community relevance are of concern of the law, while issues which are irrelevant from 
the aspect of a community as a whole, are usually not considered by the legislator. This 
assures the consistency of the legal system, as intervention into irrelevant details could 
disturb the balance within the legal system and diminish legal certainty.12 In this sense the 
de minimis rule is particularly widespread in criminal law, where certain de minimis conducts 
satisfying the definition of an offense are nonetheless declared noncriminal, because they 
‘‘really’’ do not violate the legal virtue protected by the law (eg tipping the mailman is not 
                                                          
4  Janez Kranjc, Latinski Pravni Reki (GV Založba, Ljubljana 2006) 66. Kranjc also refers to a less known 
version of the rule: Minima non curat praetor. 
5 Korolev v Russia, App no 5447/03 (ECHR, 01 April 2010). 
6 Bock v Germany, App no 22051/07 (ECHR,16 February 2010). 
7 Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
amending the Control System of the Convention, CETS No. 194, 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/194.htm> accessed 16 June 2013. See also Adrian 
Mihai Ionescu v Romania, App no 36659/04 (ECHR, 01 June 2010). 
8 Translation from French: ‘Les Magistrats ne doivent pas s'attacher à des vétilles’. 
9 The "Reward" (1818) 2 Dods 265, 165 ER 1482. 
10 See eg The People of the State of Illinois v Daniel Durham, No. 4-08-0448, 25.6.2009 (Steigmann J). 
11 Max L Veech and Charles R Moon, ‘De Minimis Non Curat Lex’, (1947) 45 Michigan L Rev 537. 
12 Kranjc (n 5) 66. 
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considered bribery, playing penny poker is not considered gambling, etc).13 The de minimis 
rule is further relevant in the field of risk regulation where it is assumed that risks that are 
highly unlikely to be realised (eg where the probability is one in a million) do not need to be 
regulated.14 The de minimis rule can also be found in copyright law, where it applies to a 
violation so trivial that the law will impose no consequence to it because its effect on the 
copyright owner is so insignificant as to be deemed meaningless. In the copyright context, 
de minimis can also be applied to the use of a work which does not involve a high enough 
level of copying to constitute substantial similarity - a required element of actionable 
copying.15 
 
In the following chapters the article focuses on the de minimis rule in the substantive sense – 
ie not as an admissibility requirement for judicial review, but as guidance to determine the 
most optimal content of the EU substantive law. 
 
3. THE DE MINIMIS RULE UNDER EU SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
 
3.1 De Minimis Agreements between Undertakings 
 
In the field of EU competition law the de minimis rule requires that agreements between 
undertakings must have a considerably restrictive effect upon free competition in order to be 
caught by Article 101 TFEU (ex 81 EC), which prohibits agreements between undertakings; an 
agreement that has a negligible effect on competition is not caught by the prohibition of 
restricting competition and is as such acceptable. When considering the illegality of 
agreements between undertakings, prohibited under Article 101 TFEU, the intensity of 
competition restrictive effect is thus of vital importance. As long as agreements, decisions of 
associations and concerted practices do not affect trade between EU Member States, they 
are not prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU as the effect upon interstate trade is one of the 
conditions for its application. Such agreements fall under national law. Furthermore, Article 
101(1) TFEU does not foresee legal consequences for agreements that affect interstate trade 
and competition but have only a marginal effect.16 The de minimis rule applies to all 
agreements that restrict competition on the internal market; however, it is assumed that 
they do not breach competition law as they only have a minimal effect on competition and 
interstate trade.17  
 
The effects of a particular agreement on competition and interstate trade are determined 
using economic analysis. The Court, however, refuses to apply purely a quantitative 
approach.  Hence, for this rule to apply, a very detailed analysis of the market is needed, 
determining the potential market fragmentation, the competitors' market shares as well as 
                                                          
13 Indian Penal Code 1860, sec 95 for example provides: ‘Nothing is an offence by reason that is causes, or that 
it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no 
person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.’ 
14 Matthew D Adler, ‘Why De Minimis?’ University of Pennsylvania Law School, Public Law Research Paper 
No. 07-26, 2007 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=992878> accessed 16 June 2013. 
15 James B Astrachan, ‘De Minimus Copyright Infringement’ The Daily Record (Baltimore MD, 2008) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1625037> accessed 16 June 2013 
16 Richard Wish, Competition Law (OUP 2009) 137-142. 
17 Marjana Coronna, ‘Konkurenčno pravo EU in Mala in Srednja Podjetja’ (2002) 5 Podjetje in Delo 767. 
When considering minimal effect one must take into consideration the Commission's Notice on agreements of 
minor importance - The Commission has issued several such notices, the most recent of which appeared in 
2001 – Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition
under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis), OJ 2001/C 368/07. 
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the general annual income of the company concerned.18 Despite meeting the general criteria 
for the application of the de minimis rule, Article 101(1) TFEU nevertheless applies to 
agreements between competitors, which have as their object price fixing, limiting output or 
sales or the allocation of markets or customers, as well as to agreements between non-
competitors, which determine sale prices or restrict the territory where the buyer may sell 
the contracted goods or services. With regard to agreements, where the competitors 
operate, for the purposes of the agreement, at a different level of the production or 
distribution chain, any of the abovementioned hard-core restrictions are prohibited.19 
According to Monti, this almost completely diminishes the importance of the de minimis 
rule.20 On the other hand, Jones and Sufrin find that the exclusion of agreements containing 
hard-core restraints from the ambit of the notice does not mean that these agreements may 
never fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU on grounds that they do not appreciably 
restrict competition. Rather, this could reflect the view that where an agreement contains 
particularly serious restrictions of competition from an EU perspective, it will not be 
considered to be of minor importance unless the parties’ market shares are considerably 
lower than set in the notice. Jones and Sufrin thus conclude that ‘the more serious the 
restrain the less likely it is to be insignificant’ and that it seems unlikely that the 
Commission would allocate resources to cases in which market shares were small.21 
Accordingly, the de minimis doctrine is particularly relevant for small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Agreements between them will rarely have a negative effect on 
interstate trade in the EU and will thus fall under the de minimis rule.22 This enables the 
SMEs to avoid provisions of competition law and the dangers of having an unenforceable 
agreement, thereby saving money with regard to administrative costs and having a better 
starting position when competing with giant agglomerations, holdings and trusts.23 
 
3.2 De Minimis State Aids 
 
The second area of EU competition law, which recognises the de minimis rule, concerns state 
aids. In 2001 the Commission adopted a Regulation on de minimis state aids whose purpose 
was to explain the application of the rule to state aids.24 Prior to the adoption of this 
Regulation it was, however, unclear whether the rule applied to state aids or not, taking into 
consideration that Article 107(1) TFEU (ex 87 EC) does not contain direct grounds for the 
de minimis rule and that the European Court of Justice was not very fond of it. Although the 
Court in 1970 in Commission v France25 implied that the amount of the aid is relevant and as a 
matter of principle agreed that insignificant aids do not fall within the scope of Article 
107(1) TFEU, in 1987 in France v Commission26, the Court decided that circumstances in 
                                                          
18 See Martina Repas, Ekonomski Pristop Določanja Upoštevnega Trga v Konkurenčnem Pravu EU (2010) 
II(1) LeXonomica 35-65. See Case 30/78 Distillers Co. Ltd v Commission [1980] ECR 2229, para 28 and Case 
100/80 Musique Diffusion Francaise v Commission [1983] ECR 1825.  
19 Notice (n 17) point 11(3). 
20 Giorgio Monti, ‘New Directions in EC Competition Policy’ in T Tridimas and others (eds), European Union 
Law for the Twenty-first Century: Internal Market and Free Movement Community Policies, Vol II - Rethinking the 
New Legal Order. Essays in European Law (Hart 2004) 187. 
21 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law (OUP 2011) 171-172; also referring to Jonathan Faull 
and Ali Nikpay (eds) The EC Law of Competition (OUP 2007) para 3.164. 
22 Notice, (n 17) point 3. 
23 Coronna (n 17) 769. 
24 Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the 
EC Treaty to de minimis aid [2001] OJ L10/30-32. 
25 Case 47/69, [1970] ECR 487. 
26 Case 259/85, [1987] ECR 4393. 
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which the aid was awarded are of greater significance than its scale.27 Ferčič emphasises 
that in this context particular importance is given to performance surpluses and to a high 
level of market competition, which demand high cost effectiveness and produce low 
profits.28 
 
On the other hand, the Commission has recognised the de minimis rule in the field of state 
aids already in 1992, providing that certain criteria have been met. This recognition was 
legally disputable causing constant dilemmas, which eventually led to the adoption of a de 
minimis state aid Regulation in 2001,29 which was later repealed by the Regulation 
1998/2006 (De Minimis Regulation).30 The Regulation provides the criteria for a de minimis 
aid, its legal consequences and control mechanisms. The de minimis rule determines the 
amount of the state aid, below which Article 107(1) TFEU does not apply, as well as the 
respective public measures which need not to be notified to the Commission. The rule is 
based on the assumption that small amounts of aid generally do not affect market 
competition and trade between two or more Member States.31   
 
3.3 De Minimis Public Purchasing 
 
The third field of EU law applying the de minimis rule concerns public purchasing. In order 
to apply EU rules to public purchasing, the ‘European dimension’ condition must be met, 
which depends upon the value of public purchasing.32 Purchasing that does not meet the 
values (thresholds) is called ‘sub-dimensional public purchasing’. In this respect the de minimis 
principle, as defined in Regulation 1177/2009,33 allows authorities to avoid an expensive 
and lengthy tendering and award procedure for low-value contracts where the costs of the 
procedure would exceed the public welfare benefits of increased transparency and 
competition associated with the procedure. On the other hand, it is understandable that the 
de minimis principle also provides an incentive for authorities to divide contracts into 
separate lots for the purpose of avoiding bothersome procedures. Although this is prohibited 
by the Directive 2004/18/EC,34 such avoidance of procurement law is difficult to detect and 
enforce and it is thought to be the main reason behind the low percentage of public 
contracts published in the EU Official Journal.35 
 
4. DE MINIMIS RULE IN THE FIELD OF THE INTERNAL MARKET FREEDOMS 
 
                                                          
27 Conor Quigley, European State Aid Law and Policy (Hart Publishing 2009) 60-61. 
28 Aleš Ferčič, Državne Pomoči Podjetje, Teorija, Praksa in Predpisi (Uradni list RS 2011) 67. 
29 Regulation on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty. 
30 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the Treaty to de minimis aid [2006] OJ L379 p 5-10. 
31 Ferčič (n 28) 68-69. See also Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application 
of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to 
undertakings providing services of general economic interest [2012]OJ L114/ 8-13. 
32 The thresholds are dependent upon the subject-matter of public purchasing and range between 125.000 (for 
public sector supply and service contracts) and 4,845.000 EUR (for public works concession contracts). 
33 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1177/2009 of 30 November 2009 amending Directives 2004/17/EC, 
2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of their application 
thresholds for the procedures for the award of contracts [2009] OJ L314/64-65. 
34 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination 
of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts 
[2004] OJ L134/114-240. 
35Christopher Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 71-72. 
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In contrast to the competition law and public purchasing, the European Court of Justice has, 
ever since Van de Haar,36 refused to apply the de minimis rule in the field of the EU internal 
market.37 In Corsica Ferries the Court even made a general statement claiming that ‘the 
articles of the (…) Treaty concerning the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital are fundamental Community provisions and any restriction, even minor, of that 
freedom is prohibited.’38 However, the Court’s case law of the past twenty years regarding 
the topic of minor restrictions to trade has not been consistent. The following chapters 
analyse the case-law of the Court in which it has not expressly accepted the de minimis rule 
in the field of the four freedoms, but how it has nevertheless given signs suggesting that the 
de minimis rule is gaining ground in the field of the internal market 
 
4.1 Free Movement of Goods 
 
Free movement of goods is founded on the removal of charges having equivalent effect to 
customs as well as on prohibition of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions. Both concepts have been interpreted by the Court as incompatible with the de 
minimis rule. Charges, prohibited by Article 30 TFEU (ex 25 EC), have been defined as ‘any 
pecuniary charge, however small and whatever designation and mode of application, which 
is imposed unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods when they cross a frontier’.39 The 
Court consequently prohibited an Italian statistical levy on goods exported to the other 
Member States and explained that ‘the very low rate of the charge cannot change its 
character with regard to (…) the legality of those charges’. Similarly broad is the Court's 
definition of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions prohibited by 
Article 34 TFEU (ex 28 EC). In Dassonville the Court explained that ‘all trading rules 
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions.’40 Considering the broad scope of the Dassonville 
formula there was no room for the recognition of the de minimis rule in the context of 
Article 34 TFEU.41 This was expressly held in Van de Haar,42 where the Court clarified this 
refusal with the following terms: 
 
Article (34 TFEU), which seeks to eliminate national measures capable of hindering trade 
between Member States, pursues an aim different from that of Article (101), which seeks to 
maintain effective competition between undertakings. A Court called upon to consider 
whether national legislation is compatible with article (34) of the Treaty must decide 
whether the measure in question is capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
                                                          
36 Joined Cases 177 and 178/82 Criminal proceedings against Jan van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern BV [1984] 
ECR 1797. 
37 See eg Case 269/83 Commission v France [1985] ECR 837. 
38 Case C-49/89 Corsica Ferries France v Direction Générale des Douanes, [1989] ECR I-4441, para 8. 
39 Case 24/68 Commission v Italy [1969] ECR 193, para 7. 
40 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837, para 5. Reference to direct and indirect, actual or 
potential hindrance to the trade between the Member States the Court ‘borrowed’ from its first ruling in the 
competition law field – Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH 
v Commission [1966] ECR 429, para 6. In this respect Steiner points out that the ‘effect upon intra-Community 
trade’ criteria could serve as a limitation of the scope of Article 34 TFEU – J Steiner ‘Drawing the Line: Uses 
and Abuses of Article 30 EEC’ (1992) 26 CMLR 749. 
41 For most recent case law, in which the Court still refers to the Dassonville formula, see eg Case C-420/01, 
Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-6445, para 25; Case C-192/01, Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR I-9693, 
para 39; Case C-41/02, Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375, para 39, and Case C-147/04 De Groot 
en Slot Allium et Bejo Zaden [2006] ECR I-245, para 71. 
42Jan van de Haar (n 36). See also Commission v France (n 37). 
 VOLUME 6 EJLS    ISSUE 1 
 
32 
 
potentially, intra-Community trade. That may be the case even though the hindrance is 
slight and even though it is possible for imported products to be marketed in other ways.43 
 
The question of applicability of the de minimis rule has further been raised in Bluhme.44 The 
defendant breached the Danish rules prohibiting the import of bees to a small island of Læso 
and some of its neighbouring islands, the aim of which was to protect the Læso brown bee 
on the islands. One of the arguments of the Danish government was that the measure was 
not caught by Article 34 TFEU as it was of a de minimis nature, considering that it only 
concerned 0,3 per cent of the Danish territory. The Court rejected the argument.45 
Similarly, in Yves Rocher the Court again affirmed that with the exception of rules having a 
purely hypothetical effect on intra-Community trade, Article 34 TFEU does not draw any 
distinction, with regard to the degree of effect on trade, between measures which can be 
classified as measures having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction.46 
 
This position has, however, been refused by Advocate General Jacobs in his well-known 
opinion in the case Leclerc-Siplec,47 where he presented his critical standpoint towards the 
Keck and Mithouard48 judgment, where the Court re-affirmed the discrimination principle. In 
this respect Jacobs claimed that ‘all undertakings should have unfettered access to the whole 
of the Community market’, and concluded that in order to prove a breach of Article 34 
TFEU a ‘substantial restriction on that access’ should be the relevant factor, even though 
this amounts to the introduction of the de minimis rule into Article 34 TFEU.49 Albeit 
Jacobs was aware that the Court refused to apply the de minimis rule in its previous free 
movement of goods case law, he insisted that ‘restrictions on trade should not be tested 
against local conditions which happen to prevail in each Member State, but against the aim 
of access to the entire Community market. A discrimination test is therefore inconsistent as 
a matter of principle with the aims of the Treaty’.50 In this respect Jacobs was surprised by 
the fact that ‘in view of the avowed aim of preventing excessive recourse to Article (34), the 
Court did not opt for such a solution in Keck.’ While applying the de minimis rule to 
restrictions on advertising, which were at stake in Leclerc-Siplec, Jacobs suggested that ‘a 
total ban on the advertising of a product which may lawfully be sold in the Member State 
                                                          
43 Jan van de Haar (n 36), para 14. 
44 Case C-67/97 Criminal Proceeding against Ditlev Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033. 
45 See also Joined Cases C-277, 318 and 319/91 Ligur Carni Srl and Genova Carni Srl v Unità Sanitaria Locale 
[1993] ECR I-6621, concerning a prohibition of the municipality of Genova in accordance with which traders 
importing fresh meat into the municipality were banned from using their own means of transport to deliver 
their goods within the territory of the municipality, unless they paid a local undertaking the amount 
corresponding to the services which that undertaking provided under an exclusive concession for handling in 
the municipal slaughterhouse, transporting and delivering the goods in question. Although the rule was 
limited to one municipality, it was found to breach Article 34 TFEU. Similarly, the Court refused to apply the 
de minimis rule also in Case 16/83 Prantl [1984] ECR 1299; Commission v France (n 37); and in Case 103/84 
Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 1759. 
46 Case 126/91 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e. V v Yves Rocher [1993] ECR I-2361, para 21. 
See also Case C-292/92 Ruth Hünermund and others v Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR 
I-6787, Opinion of AG Tesauro. 
47 Case C-412/93 Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 Publicité [1995] ECR I-179, Opinion of AG Jacobs paras 195 
and 196. See also his opinion in case C-112/00 Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659, para 65, where he 
stated: ‘It would seem for example out of the question that a brief delay to traffic on a road occasionally used 
for intra-Community transport could in any way fall within the scope of Article (34). A longer interruption on 
a major transit route may none the less call for a different assessment.’ 
48 Joined Cases C-267 and 268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. 
49 See para 42 of the opinion in Case C-412/93 (n 47). See also Rosa Greaves, ‘A Commentary on Selected 
Opinions of Advocate General Jacobs’ (2006) 29 Fordham Intl L J 690-715. 
50Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 47), para. 40. 
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where the ban is imposed and in other Member States cannot lie outside the scope of Article 
(34).’51 Even though Jacobs applied the de minimis test the French measure was nevertheless 
found to breach free movement of goods.52 The Court, however, rejected his proposal 
altogether. On the basis of this case law it may be concluded that a state measure can 
constitute a prohibited measure having an equivalent effect even if: a) it is of relatively 
minor economic significance; b) it is only applicable to a very limited geographical part of a 
national territory; and c) it only affects a limited number of imports/exports or a limited 
number of economic operators.53 
 
Nevertheless, certain national rules have been found to fall outside the scope of Article 
34 TFEU if their restrictive effect on trade between Member States is too uncertain and too 
indirect. In this respect the Court held in Burmanjer54 that the national rules at issue, which 
made the itinerant sale of subscriptions to periodicals subject to prior authorisation, had an 
effect on the marketing of products from other Member States that was too insignificant 
and too uncertain to be regarded as being such as to hinder or otherwise interfere with 
trade between Member States. That the restrictive effects on the free movement of goods 
are ‘too uncertain and too indirect to be considered to be an obstacle to trade between the 
Member States’ was further held by the Court in BASF,55 where the President of the 
German Patent Office ruled that a European patent belonging to BASF was void in 
Germany on grounds that its proprietor had not filed a German translation of the patent 
specification. A similar decision was also adopted in Krantz,56 where a German debt 
collector seized all the movable property found on the premises of the company in order to 
recover a tax debt. The Court ruled that the possibility of nationals of other Member States 
hesitating to sell goods on instalment terms to purchasers because such goods could be 
liable to seizure by the collector of taxes if the purchasers failed to discharge its tax debts 
was ‘too uncertain and indirect to warrant the conclusion that a national provision 
authorizing such seizure is liable to hinder trade between Member States’.57 From this series 
of cases a conclusion can be made that Article 34 TFEU is not breached by national 
legislation which makes no distinction between the origin of the substance transported, 
whose purpose is not to regulate trade in goods with other Member States and whose 
potential restrictive effects on the free movement of goods are too uncertain and too indirect 
to be regarded as a hindrance to trade between Member States.58 
 
                                                          
51 ibid para 50. 
52 For a comment see Laurence Idot ‘Annotation, Case C-412/93, Société d’Importation Édouard Leclerc-
Siplec v TF1’ (1996) 33 CMLR 120. 
53 See Van de Haar (n 36); Commission v France (n 37); Commission v Italy (n. 41). See also European Commission, 
Free Movement of Goods, Guide to the Application of Treaty Provisions Governing the Free Movement of 
Goods, 2010 <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/files/goods/docs/art34-
36/new_guide_en.pdf> accessed 16 June 2013). 
54 Case C-20/03 Burmanjer and Others [2005] ECR I-4133. 
55 Case C-44/98 BASF v Präsident des Deutschen Patentamts [1999] ECR I-6269. 
56 Case C-69/88 Krantz [1990] ECR I-583, para 11. 
57 ibid para 11. 
58 See eg Catherine Barnard, ‘Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jigsaw’ (2001) 26 
European L Rev 52. 
See Case C-379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para. 24. The case concerned the rules applicable to the 
discharge of hydrocarbons and other harmful substances into the sea. See also Case C-93/92 CMC 
Motorradcenter v Pelin Baskiciogullari [1993] ECR I-5009, para. 12 – in this Case a German importer was 
required to inform the purchaser of a Yamaha motorcycle that German dealers, authorized by the Yamaha 
corporation, often refused to carry out repairs under the warranty for vehicles which were subject to parallel 
imports. The test has also been applied in Cases C-266/96 Corsica Ferries France [1998] ECR I-3949, para. 31 
and C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto [1995] ECR I-2883, para 41. 
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Furthermore, the applicability of Article 35 TFEU (ex 29 EC), which prohibits trade 
barriers to export, was narrowed in Italo Fenocchio.59 From the latter it is evident that with 
regard to measures with an effect equal to quantitative restrictions in exports, the de minimis 
test must be used, according to which the remoteness of the effect on exports is assessed. 
The case referred to a national provision prohibiting the issuance of a summary payment 
order in cases where the defendant lived in another Member State. The plaintiff believed 
that such a provision restricted exports but the Court did not agree, explaining that ‘the 
possibility that nationals would therefore hesitate to sell goods to purchasers established in 
other Member States is too uncertain and indirect for that national provision to be regarded 
as liable to hinder trade between Member States.’60 
 
4.2 Free Movement of Workers 
 
Just like in the field of free movement of goods, the Court has also not expressly recognised 
the application of the de minimis rule in the field of free movement of workers. In Bosman61 it 
was held that free movement of workers is based on the market access principle. Even 
though citizenship played no role in the application of the disputed rules, this did not 
prevent the Court from applying Article 45 TFEU (ex 39 EC). Based on this ruling the 
Court further held in Graf that ‘(p)rovisions which, even if they are applicable without 
distinction, preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of 
origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement […] constitute an obstacle to 
that freedom (of movement of workers, N/A). However, in order to be capable of 
constituting such an obstacle, they must affect access of workers to the labour market.’62 
The Graf case concerned German regulation which prevented workers from receiving 
compensation on termination of employment in cases when it was the worker, as opposed to 
the employer, who terminated the employment contract. The Court's ruling is important 
from the point of view of application of the de minimis rule to the field of the internal market, 
for the Court introduced the test of an ‘uncertain and indirect’63 restriction to free movement 
from Krantz and other rulings to the field of free movement of workers and furthermore 
decided that such barriers do not breach Article 45 TFEU. Due to the fact that the 
respective national regulation did not deny workers the right to compensation on 
termination of employment because they terminated the employment contract for reasons of 
finding employment in another Member State, the Court found that ‘such an event is too 
uncertain and indirect a possibility for legislation to be capable of being regarded as liable to 
hinder freedom of movement for workers’.64 With this the de minimis rule was introduced 
into the scope of this freedom.65 
 
4.3 Free Movement of Services and Freedom of Establishment 
 
                                                          
59 Case C-412/97 ED Srl v Italo Fenocchio [1999] ECR I-3845. 
60 ibid para 11. 
61 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL and others v Jean Marc Bosman 
[1995] ECR I-4921. For comments see Amicam Omer Kranz, ‘The Bosman Case: The Relationship between 
European Union Law and the Transfer System in European Football’ (1999) 5 Columbia J Eur L 431; Stephen 
Weatherill, ‘Comment on Case C-415/95, Bosman’ (1995) 32 CMLR 991; Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC 
Law: A Study of the Relationship between the Freedoms (OUP 2002), fn 99. 
62 Case C-190/98 Volker Graf [2000] ECR I-493, para 23. 
63 French: aléatoire et indirecte; German: ungewiß und indirekt. 
64 Volker Graf (n 62) para 25. 
65 See also Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (OUP 2006) 491. 
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As was the case with free movement of goods and workers, the Court has likewise not 
expressly accepted the de minimis rule in the field of free movement of services. In Säger v 
Dennemeyer66 the Court explained that Article 56 TFEU (ex 49 EC)  
 
requires not only the elimination of all discrimination against a person providing services on 
the ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies 
without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, 
when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services 
established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services.67  
 
This ruling follows the all-encompassing interpretation of the internal market freedoms in 
line with the Dassonville formula. Notwithstanding this, however, signs suggesting that the 
de minimis rule is gaining ground can also be found in the field of free movement of services. 
In this regard, Viacom II68 is authoritative. In this case it was disputed whether a special 
municipal tax on poster advertising constituted a (part of the) service which must be paid 
for by the recipient of the service. The recipient of the service claimed that such a tax (which 
amounted to more than two hundred EUR) was prohibited by Article 56 TFEU (ex 49 EC). 
Despite the fact that the tax itself was non-discriminatory, the recipient claimed that it 
represented an obstacle to the free movement of services which, taking into account the rule 
referred to in Säger,69 should not exist. The Court held that such a tax  
 
is fixed at a level which may be considered modest in relation to the value of the services 
provided which are subject to it’ and that ‘the levying of such a tax is not on any view liable 
to prohibit, impede or otherwise make less attractive the provision of advertising services to 
be carried out in the territory of the municipalities concerned.70  
 
Accordingly, the tax was found not to be in contravention of Article 56 TFEU, as it was 
neither discriminatory nor too high. By applying the latter condition, the Court has actually 
introduced the de minimis rule into Article 56 TFEU.71 Similarly in Mobistar,72 where 
municipal legislation imposing a tax on pylons, mast and transmission antennae for mobile 
communication systems was challenged, the Court observed that ‘measures, the only effect 
of which is to create additional costs in respect of the service in question and which affect in 
the same way the provision of services between Member States and that within one Member 
State, do not fall within the scope of Article (56) of the Treaty’.73 Meulman and Waele thus 
conclude that with regard to the service provision, permissible measures under Article 56 
TFEU could in the future be those which would apply without distinction - either 
consisting of minor obstacles to market access or failing that, affecting in the same manner, 
in law and in fact both, bilateral and unilateral service transactions.74 Arnull similarly 
                                                          
66 Case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd. [1991] ECR I-4221. 
67 ibid para 12. 
68 Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor Srl v Giotto Immobilier SARL [2005] ECR I-1167. 
69 Säger v Dennemeyer (n 66). 
70 Viacom (n 68) para. 38. 
71 Johen Meulman and Henri de Waele, ‘A Retreat from Säger? Servicing or Fine-Tuning the Application of 
Article 49 EC’ (2006) 33 L Issues of Economic Integration 226. 
72 Joined Cases C-544 and 545/03 Mobistar SA v Commune de Fléron [2005] ECR I-7723. 
73 ibid, para 31. 
74 ibid. See also Rajko Knez, Prosto Opravljanje Storitev in Razvoj Sodne Prakse do Leta 2006 – Ali je Zadeva 
Säger še Pomembna? (2007) 2 Revizor 115. 
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concludes that Article 56 TFEU ‘bites only where there is more than a remote or uncertain 
effect on freedom of movement’.75 
 
Additionally, the de minimis rule can also be found in the field of freedom of establishment. 
In Semeraro Casa,76 which concerned Italian legislation on closing retail outlets on Sundays 
and public holidays, the Court decided, in line with Article 49 TFEU (ex 43 EC), that the 
legislation in question was applicable to all traders exercising their activity on national 
territory; that its purpose was not to regulate the conditions concerning the establishment 
of the undertakings concerned; and that any restrictive effects which it might have on the 
freedom of establishment were ‘too uncertain and indirect for the obligation laid down to be 
regarded as being capable of hindering that freedom’.77 Consequently, the Court found that 
the freedom of establishment did not preclude national rules from regulating the closing 
times of shops. 
 
4.4 Free Movement of Capital 
 
A focus on impediments to market access, which tries to be accommodated with the de 
minimis test can also be traced in the field of free movement of capital. A de minimis 
exception within the ambit of this freedom has been suggested by the United Kingdom in 
the golden shares case,78 where the UK government argued that the national measures at 
issue were not of such a nature as to restrict access to the market, for they were too 
uncertain and too indirect to amount to a restriction on the freedoms and would thus not be 
subject to Article 63 TFEU (ex 56 EC). The Court entered into a substantive examination of 
the effects of the national measures, which it would not have done, had it proceeded from 
the assumption that such a consideration would be inadmissible with respect to the free 
movement of capital.79 Hindelang states that in principle any national measure ultimately 
affects the access of capital to a market, whereas many do it only insignificantly. By 
paraphrasing the Court’s judgment in the UK golden shares case he concludes that a 
measure substantially impedes market access when it affects ‘the position of a person 
acquiring a shareholding as such’,80 which must be left to the Court to clarify – in a casuistic 
way.81 
 
4.5 Rocky Road to Define De Minimis in the Internal Market Field 
 
From the above analysis it may be deduced that the Court has never explicitly applied the de 
minimis rule to the field of the internal market; even so, some measures in the field of all four 
freedoms are considered as insubstantially restricting market access and are thus not caught 
by the articles of the Treaty regulating the freedoms. Since there are different opinions 
among commentators whether ‘substantial restriction’ (also called the ‘remoteness’) test is 
in fact a form of the de minimis rule or not, it is submitted that from the author’s point of 
view there are two aspects of the ‘de minimis’ rule in the field of the internal market: 
 
                                                          
75 Arnull (n 65) 492, also referring to Case C-159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685 and Joined Cases C-51 and 
191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549. 
76 Case C-418/93 Semeraro di casa [1996] ECR I-2975. 
77 ibid para 32. 
78 Case C-98/01 Commission v United Kingdom [2003] ECR I-4641, para 36. 
79 Steffen Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment, (OUP 2009) 126. 
80 Commission v United Kingdom (n 78) para 61. 
81 ibid 127. 
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a) De minimis in terms of quantity: this is de minimis in the sense the European Court of 
Justice understands it. When the Court has ruled in Van de Haar82 that the de minimis 
rule is not acceptable in the area of free movement, it has taken more of a quantity 
approach – i.e. the number of concerned products. According to the Court’s view, for 
a certain measure to be challenged under free movement rules it does not have to 
affect a great amount of products (workers, services or capital flows); it suffices for a 
natural person to be restricted when importing a single product and reliance on 
Article 34 TFEU is already allowable.  
 
b) De minimis in terms of quality: here de minimis is not about the number of the 
concerned products, workers, services, capital flows, but about the intensity of a 
measure’s effect.83 If the factors of production are heavily affected, if the measure has 
a significant (certain and direct) effect on the market access, then the measure will be 
caught by the principles on fundamental freedoms. If, however, the effect of the 
measure is ‘too uncertain and indirect’, ‘too remote’, if it lacks significant effect on 
the market access, then it is not caught by the Treaties. The Court recognised this in 
a series of cases, eg in Kranz, although in a non-consistent manner and without 
detailed explanation what the terms, such as significant, certain, direct and remote 
mean. 
 
As the word significant is considerably ambiguous and cannot be expressed in quantitative 
terms it is a convenient concept of interpretation for both advocates of a centralist and 
decentralist internal market. The remoteness test is closely related to the question of 
causality or to the jurisdictional criteria, according to which measures having no effect on 
cross-border trade stay in the national autonomy, whereas those having (any) effect on trade 
are within the scope of the fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, the de minimis rule in this 
sense is not just about causality, but it requires a significant effect upon the cross-border 
trade for a measure to legitimately fall within the Treaty. 
 
In this respect Jacobs explains that where a measure prohibits the sale of goods lawfully 
placed on the market in another Member State (as in Cassis de Dijon), it may be presumed to 
have a substantial impact on access to the market, since the goods are either denied access 
altogether or can gain access only after being modified in some way; the need to modify the 
goods is in itself a substantial barrier to market access.84 On the other hand, however, one 
cannot claim the same for measures applicable without distinction, which simply restrict 
certain selling arrangements, by stipulating when, where, how, by whom or at what price 
the goods may be sold. Whether such measures significantly hinder free movement would, 
according to Jacobs, depend on a number of factors, such as whether it applies to certain 
goods,85 to most goods86 or to all goods87 on the extent to which other selling arrangements 
remain available, and on whether the effect of the measure is direct or indirect, immediate or 
                                                          
82 Jan van de Haar (n 36). 
83 In this sense de minimis is understood, eg, by Arnull (n 65) 491; Hindelang (n 79) 125; and Christoph Krenn, 
‘A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect ‘jigsaw’: Horizontal Direct Effect and the Free Movement of Goods’, 
(2012) 49 CMLR 210-212. 
84 Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 47) para 44. 
85 As in Case 75/81 Belgium v Blesgen [1982] ECR 1211, in the Case 382/87 Buet [1989] ECR 1235 or in Case 
C-23/89 Quitlynn [1990] ECR I-3059. 
86 As in Case 145/88 Torfaen BC v B&Q [1989] ECR 3851. 
87 Keck and Mithouard (n 48). 
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remote, or purely speculative88 and uncertain.89 Accordingly, Jacobs emphasises that the 
magnitude of the barrier to market access may vary enormously: it may range from the 
insignificant to a quasi-prohibition. In this respect the de minimis test could perform a useful 
function.90 His explicit proposal in Leclerc-Siplec to introduce the de minimis test to the field 
of the internal market freedoms thus understandably led to mixed responses. 
 
5. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ADOPTING THE DE MINIMIS RULE IN THE 
INTERNAL MARKET FIELD 
 
Scholars offer various explanations why EU law recognises the de minimis rule in the field of 
competition law but not in the field of the internal market.  
 
5.1 The Difference between the Internal Market and Competition Law 
 
Gormley recognises the differences between the two fields, emphasising that the internal 
market and competition law have different roles and subject-matter, which makes the de 
minimis rule more appropriate to one field than the other.91 He particularly highlights that 
competition law concentrates on the effects a measure has on patterns of trade between 
Member States and not on effects on trade itself, which is a much simpler concept.92 At the 
same time competition law, as opposed to the internal market, does not assist in the removal 
of national hindrances to trade between Member States through negative integration. 
Davies, on the other hand, with regard to the differences between the two fields, highlights 
that competition law is able to build itself around non-legal ideas, as no competition case is 
complete without a market survey, while free movement law lacks enthusiasm for 
empiricism, particularly because free movement cases do not tend to pass through the 
Commission on their way to the Court, but rather arise from preliminary references by 
national courts. Since the Court decides principles rather than facts, which are then applied 
by the national courts to the individual facts, claims Davies, the Court held in O'Flynn93 that 
in order to establish discrimination it is not necessary to show an ‘actual’ disparate impact 
on the internal market, but merely that a measure is liable to have one.94 Furthermore, since 
market surveys cost money, competition law is concerned merely with big commerce, 
significant restrictions and important economic players, who have such money, whereas free 
movement often concerns small players, like Bosman. Requiring market investigations in 
order to determine whether such small player’s rights to free movement have been breached 
would almost certainly mean denying them of their rights. On these bases, Davies concludes 
that market language cannot automatically be transferred from one field to another.95 
 
5.2 Public and Private Interventions in the Market 
 
An additional reason for refusing the de minimis rule to enter the field of the internal market 
is that the freedoms predominantly concern the measures of Member States and not those of 
                                                          
88 As an example Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 47) refers to para. 15 of the Court’s judgment in Case C-169/91 
Stoke-on-Trent [1992] ECR I-6635. 
89 For example Case C-69/88 Krantz [1990] ECR I-583, para 11 of the judgment. 
90 Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 47) para. 45. 
91 Laurence W Gormley, ‘Competition and Free Movement: Is the Internal Market the Same as a Common 
Market?’ (2002) 13 Eur Business L Rev 517, 520. 
92 Thereby referring to Case 15/79 P.B. Groenveld BV [1979] ECR 3409. 
93 Case C-237/94 O'Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617. 
94 ibid para 21. 
95 Gareth Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (Kluwer 2003) 96-98. 
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private entities, as is the case with competition law. It is the public bodies who should have a 
greater responsibility for the functioning of the internal market than private entities. In this 
respect Barents observed years ago that ‘state interventions on the market may be said to 
have an appreciable effect by their very nature’,96 whereas Krenn recently proposed a more 
convergent approach towards public and private intervention on the market and argued in 
favour of introducing the horizontal direct effect of Article 34 TFEU accompanied by a 
recognition of the de minimis rule97 in order to prohibit only those barriers of private entities 
that significantly hinder access to the market. According to his opinion, most private 
measures would not be caught by Article 34 TFEU as there are alternative channels to 
market goods; the recognition of the horizontal direct effect of Article 34 TFEU as a matter 
of principle would, however, bring free movement of goods in line with the case law in the 
field of personal freedoms. 
 
5.3 National Courts’ Concern 
 
An additional explanation for the refusal of the de minimis rule in the field of the internal 
market was given by Advocate General Jacobs,98 who pointed out the danger of applying 
the de minimis test to all measures affecting trade in goods, as this might induce national 
courts, who are primarily responsible for the application of the fundamental freedoms, to 
exclude too great a number of measures from the scope of the prohibition laid down by this 
provision. Similarly, Mortelmans pointed out that the de minimis test would not assure clear 
guidelines for the explanation of judgements by national courts, as it would demand a 
complete review of the legal and economic framework,99 while Oliver warned that reliance 
on statistical data would lead to depraved results as the legality of a measure could change 
on a monthly basis.100 Oliver thus claimed that the application of the de minimis rule to the 
internal market freedoms would cause practical problems, introduce a new element of legal 
uncertainty and consequently make it much more difficult for national courts to apply the 
internal market provisions of the Treaty.101 Finally, Advocate General Tesauro was of the 
opinion that ‘to apply a de minimis rule in the field of trade in goods (…) is, it seems to me, 
very difficult, if not downright impossible’.102 Jacobs, who generally defended the 
application of the de minimis rule to the field of the freedoms, warned that caution must be 
exercised and if the de minimis test is to be introduced, the circumstances, under which it 
should be applied, must be carefully defined.103 He particularly pointed out that it would not 
be appropriate to apply the de minimis test to measures which overtly discriminated against 
goods from other Member States; such measures should remain, in line with the per se 
prohibition of overtly discriminatory measures, prohibited by Article 34 TFEU even if their 
effect on inter-State trade is only slight.104 According to Jacobs, the introduction of a 
substantial restriction on market access requirement would therefore only be necessary in 
                                                          
96 Rene Barents, ‘Measures of Equivalent Effect: Some Recent Developments’ (1981) 18 CMLR 287. 
97 Krenn (n 83) 177-215. 
98 Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 47) para 42. 
99 Kamiel Mortelmans, ‘Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and Legislation Relating to Market Circumstances: 
Time to Consider a New Definition’ (1991) 28 CMLR 127 and Kamil Mortelmans, ‘Towards Convergence in 
the Application of Rules on Free Movement and on Competition?’ (2001) 38 CMLR 626. 
100 Peter Oliver, ‘Some Further Reflections on the Scope of Articles 28-30’ (1999) 36 CMLR 796. 
101 Peter Oliver (ed) Oliver on Free Movement of Goods in the European Union (Hart Publishing 2010) 92-93, para 
6.18. 
102 Ruth Hünermund (n 48) Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 21. 
103 Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 47) para 42. 
104 ibid para 43. 
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relation to measures which are applicable without distinction to domestic goods and goods 
from other Member States.105 
 
5.4 Fundamental Principles Argument 
 
The final reason why the Court refused to apply the de minimis rule to the field of economic 
freedoms, as is evident from Corsica Ferries, might lie in the fact that it considers the 
freedoms as fundamental principles of EU law where all barriers should be prohibited, 
including minor ones106 - much the same as the de minimis rule cannot be applied to the field 
of human rights. On the other hand, the Court also regards Article 101 TFEU to be ‘a 
fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to 
the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal market’,107 but even so 
this provision is subject to the de minimis rule. This speaks in favour of a systematic 
recognition of the de minimis rule in the internal market field. 
 
6. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE DE MINIMIS RULE IN THE INTERNAL 
MARKET FIELD 
 
6.1 Sensible and Mature Market Regulation 
 
According to Greaves, the proposal of Advocate General Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec is highly 
persuasive and has much in its favour as it reflects the competition law approach to the field 
of the internal market freedoms. This makes sense, says Greaves, as the two share a 
common objective, which is to integrate national markets into a single market, undivided by 
national territorial boundaries, national laws and regulations or private contractual 
arrangements.108 In this respect O’Keeffe and Bavasso note that the aim of creating an 
internal market constitutes ‘a unifying thread’ between EU internal trade law and 
competition law and that the ‘common ancestry’ of competition and free movement can be 
traced to the fact that both sets of rules are subject to an assessment of the effect on trade 
between Member States.109 Krenn too is of the opinion that excluding certain insignificant 
threats from the scope of the freedoms would be a sign of maturity in the application of the 
internal market provisions, allowing efficient control of those measures that do present a 
significant peril to the internal market. This is accepted as common sense in competition 
law and should, according to Krenn, be accepted also with regard to Article 34 TFEU.110 
Krenn furthermore stresses that the thresholds for the application of the de minimis rule to 
the field of the internal market will necessarily differ from the ones in the field of 
competition law, thereby advocating the effet utile approach in the field of the internal 
market in order to effectively monitor significant threats to the internal market.111 
                                                          
105 ibid para 44. 
106 Corsica Ferries (n 38), para 8; Case C-212/06 Government of Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon v 
Gouvernement flamand [2008] ECR 1683, para 52. See Oliver (n 101) 91, para 6.18. 
107 Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV, [1999] ECR 3055, para. 36. 
108 Greaves (n 49) 696. See also Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, ‘Die Bedeutung der 
Wettbewerbsregeln in der Wirtschaftsvefassung der EG‘ in Ulrich Immenga and  Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker 
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(2nd edn, CUP 2010) 754. 
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In this respect Perišin points out that nothing distinguishes the de minimis rule from other 
formulas, such as the one for selling arrangements in the Keck ruling, emphasising that all 
substantive assessments of a measure leave a degree of discretion to the adjudicator which 
can cause legal uncertainty.112 The latter has been defined by Advocate General Kokott as 
the main downside of the de minimis rule in the field of the internal market,113 however, 
Perišin states that the de minimis rule is a substantive criteria and as such much more 
appropriate than formal criteria, such as the one in the Keck formula, which, according to 
Kokott’s opinion, should also be applied to measures concerning the use of goods. 
 
6.2 Subsidiarity Aspect – More Legitimate Market Regulation 
 
Perhaps the most important advantage of the de minimis rule is that it presents a convenient 
concept for reducing centralisation in the field of the internal market and it balances free 
trade and national autonomy. The rule addresses questions about the desirable degree of 
market integration as well as the recommendable scope of prohibition within the EU law. 
These issues touch upon the main problem that is the line between legitimate and 
illegitimate national legislation: how many restrictions can the internal market handle and 
when do national measures need to be removed. The establishment of the internal market 
has brought many advantages to the EU Member States and can in this respect be 
considered as indisputable success. Nevertheless, economic liberalisation has inevitably also 
brought costs to the Member States. These are related not only to the loss of national 
legislative autonomy far beyond strict market law, but also to the resulting erosion of 
national social and cultural values. This often occurred without discussing various 
institutional alternatives that are available when setting legal rules, even though economic 
analyses pose various issues of democracy.114  
 
The application of the de minimis rule to various fields of EU law reflects the principle of 
subsidiarity, which was introduced to the Treaties in order to increase the flexibility of 
European governance and to limit centralism.115 It protects the rights of the national 
legislators to choose between various political alternatives within the scope of their 
competences and discretions.116 Each institution entrusted with the regulation of the 
internal market needs to protect, according to the principle of subsidiarity, the appropriate 
balance between different goals of EU legal acts. Namely, the main goal of the EU is to 
achieve optimal benefits for society by balancing free trade interests with other EU and 
Member States' interest. In this respect, the recognition of the de minimis rule in the field of 
the internal market is in line with the abovementioned statement of the former internal 
market Commissioner McCreevy on the need of the internal market to become more 
decentralised. In this regard the principle of subsidiarity must be taken into consideration 
                                                          
112 Tamara Perišin, Free Movement of Goods and Limits of Regulatory Autonomy in the EU and WTO (T.M.C. 
Asser Press 2008) 39. 
113 Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos [2009] ECR I-4273, Opinion of AG Kokott, 
para. 46. 
114 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court, The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution, A 
Critical Reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (Hart Publishing 1998); Neil K Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives – 
Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy (University of Chicago Press 1994). 
115 See art 5(3) TEU. 
116 George A Bermann, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the 
United States’, (1994) 94 Columbia L Rev 332-455; Grainne de Burca, ‘Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance 
After Amsterdam’, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, No. 7/1999; Thomas Horsley, ‘Subsidiarity and the 
European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?’, (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 267-282. 
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when adopting EU secondary legislation as well as when interpreting the provisions of the 
EU Treaties. Substantive market rules (eg the Dassonville formula) are in fact hidden 
institutional criteria for the division of powers between EU institutions and Member States. 
In line with this the principle of subsidiarity requires genuine institutional criteria which 
will enable the identification of situations where complete unification of market law is 
legitimate and where it is not, or in other words, where the effectiveness of the internal 
market requires diversity (ie preservation of various national rules) and where unification is 
needed (ie common rules). 
 
In this context the de minimis rule presents an important concept for the enforcement of the 
principle of subsidiarity in the field of the internal market. As Perišin points out, it is 
appropriate, in view of EU's ambitious aims - primarily the creation of a single market, to go 
beyond non-protectionism, which is still the main requirement of the WTO, and even 
beyond non-discrimination. She emphasises, however, that times have changed since 
Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon,117 as it is no longer necessary for the freedoms to be as broad 
as to cover all obstacles to trade and that the Court's review of measures only remotely 
connected to the internal market would present an unnecessary burden for national 
regulatory autonomy. This would furthermore also endanger the legitimacy of the EU. In 
this regard Perišin notices that an approach based on substantial hindrance of market access 
seems to be developing and advocates that only this kind of measures should be caught by 
the EU Treaties.118 
 
Broadening the concept of uncertain and indirect hindrances to free movement, which are not 
prohibited by EU law, is also in line with the Court's interpretation of Article 114 TFEU (ex 
95 EC), considering its emphasis in the tobacco advertising case119 that recourse to Article 
114 TFEU as a legal basis is only possible if the ‘aim is to prevent the emergence of future 
obstacles to trade resulting from multifarious development of national laws’, adding that 
‘the emergence of such obstacles must be likely’120 and that reliance on Article 114 TFEU is 
not legitimate ‘when the measure to be adopted only incidentally harmonises market 
conditions within the Community’.121 For this reason the Court held that Article 114 TFEU 
cannot be applied to the so-called static advertising media as the effect on free movement of 
goods was too ‘remote and indirect’.122 
 
As an instrument for establishing balance between state and federal authorities in the field 
of interstate regulation, the de minimis rule is also applied in the USA. In the famous Pike v 
Church123 case, the US Supreme Court decided: ‘where the statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
                                                          
117 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649. 
118 Perišin (n 112) 39. 
119 Case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, para 86. 
120 ibid para 86. 
121 ibid para 33. 
122 ibid para. 109. It is also worth noting that since the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 
2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] 
OJ L1/1-25 entered into force, argumentation that enforcement of competition law is centralised, whereas 
enforcement of the de minimis rule in the field of market freedoms by national authorities would keep too many 
(significant) hindrances to the internal market, is no longer convincing. Regulation 1/2003 provides for a 
decentralised application of arts 101 and 102 TFEU by the Commission, national competition authorities and 
national courts – arts 4, 5 and 6 of the Regulation 1/2003. See for example Jones and Sufrin (n 21) 1021 and 
Michael J Frese, ‘Decentralised Enforcement of EU Competition Law and the Institutional Autonomy of the 
Member States: A Case Commentary’, Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 2011-04.
123 Pike v Bruce Church, Inc 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
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incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’ Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in 
Hughes v Oklahoma124 that ‘the range of regulations that a State may adopt […] is extremely 
broad, particularly where, as here, the burden on interstate commerce is, at most, minimal’, 
and judge Frankfurter noted in H P Hood & Sons125 that ‘[b]ehind the distinction between 
'substantial' and 'incidental' burdens upon interstate commerce is a recognition that, in the 
absence of federal regulation, it is sometimes (…) of greater importance that local interests 
be protected than that interstate commerce be not touched.’ Finally, the case of Jones & 
Laughlin Steel should be pointed out, where the Supreme Court warned that competences to 
regulate interstate trade must be assessed ‘in the light of our dual system of government 
and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and 
remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate 
the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely 
centralized government.’126 This proves the Supreme Court’s practical orientation towards 
assuring a workable market, whereas the refusal to apply the de minimis test systematically 
in the EU internal market shows the EU Court’s determination to establish an ideal internal 
market, despite the fact that the former judge of the Court Jann realistically noted that: 
‘Discussions must concentrate on the common market that truly exists and not on the ideal 
market that has no failures. The latter simply does not exist’.127 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The de minimis rule is recognised in various legal fields, within procedural as well as 
substantive law. Even though this rule is derived from various laws, executive acts and case 
law and has broad support by scholars, Adler emphasises that relying on the de minimis rule 
is not morally justifiable. According to him, de minimis tests have no basis in the ideal moral 
theory. The ideal moral theory provides norms for idealized decision makers, who are fully 
rational and motivated to comply with the norms. Although there are no ideal decision 
makers, ideal moral theories can be seen as a useful analytical tool to review legal rules in 
general, including the de minimis rule.128 The ideal moral theory ignores the problems of 
bounded rationality and imperfect compliance,129 however, Adler finds that none of the 
moral theories would direct an idealized government decision maker, who is fully rational 
and conscientious in complying with the demands of the theory, to employ a de minimis 
test.130 
 
In contrast to these general conclusions about the de minimis rule, one may nevertheless 
conclude that this rule has a rather different meaning under EU internal market law, as it 
increases the autonomy of national authorities, thereby strengthening democratic decision-
making in the EU as a multi-level governance system. On the basis of this rule, Member 
                                                          
124 Hughes v Oklahoma 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
125 H P Hood & Sons, Inc v Du Mond 336 U. S. 525, at 567 (1949). 
126 301 U.S. 1 (1937) at 37. See also United States v Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) where it has been decided that: 
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States keep their competences in the field of market law with regard to rules which do not 
formally discriminate between domestic and foreign goods, people, services and capital, the 
purpose of which is not to regulate trade with other Member States and whose potential 
restrictive effects on the functioning of the internal market are too uncertain and too 
indirect for the obligation which they lay down to be regarded as being in breach of the EU 
Treaties. In this respect one may argue that it is immoral (or at least democratically 
illegitimate) for EU law to prohibit all Member States’ trading rules, as the European Court 
of Justice has proclaimed in its 40-year old judgment of Dassonville. 
 
As the Court already discovered twenty years ago that the Dassonville formula was too wide, 
that Member States did not approve of it and that, despite its breadth it still did not enable 
effective enforcement of the internal market law, the Court narrowed it down by forming a 
formal (Keck) test, according to which rules on selling arrangements were left to national 
autonomy. By contrast, the de minimis test is a substantive test, which does not differentiate 
between rules on certain selling arrangements and the characteristics of goods, but 
regardless of the content of a rule it is judged by its effect on the internal market – in so far 
as this effect is not significant, the rule does not breach EU law. Additionally, systematic 
recognition of the rule would facilitate the understanding of the horizontal direct effect of 
the freedoms and enable the EU Court of Justice to accept the horizontal direct effect in the 
field of free movement of goods and capital.131 In accordance with the de minimis rule, 
insignificant barriers to free movement imposed by private entities would not present a 
breach of the internal market rules, whereas national measures would be subdued to a 
‘remoteness’ test, which would measure how direct the impact of the rules concerned is on 
free movement of goods, workers, services and capital between Member States. In this 
respect all four freedoms could prohibit formally (directly) as well as actually (indirectly) 
discriminatory measures that significantly hinder access to the market – such as a complete 
prohibition of selling certain goods or providing certain services,132 whereas national and 
private measures with an insignificant effect on the internal market, could remain. 
 
Despite all the advantages of the transfer of the de minimis rule from the EU competition 
law to the field of the internal market, the actual transfer is all but easy. It must foremost be 
accepted that the rule is not identical in both fields, as its purpose is not the same. In this 
respect one cannot count on having concrete mathematical criteria for defining a significant 
and an insignificant (remote, uncertain, indirect) restriction to the single internal market. 
One must also recognise that although the de minimis rule would increase the autonomy of 
the Member States in the market field and thus increase the legitimacy of EU law in light of 
the subsidiarity principle, most national courts would not necessarily accept such broader 
competences with delight.133 An additional difficulty related to the application of the de 
minimis rule by national courts lies in the fact that even within a single Member State 
national judges might come to different conclusions. This is the main concern of advocates 
of centralism in the market field as differential application of the rule can lead to 
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compartmentalisation of the single market. In this respect, the de minimis rule would firstly 
have to be interpreted by the EU Court of Justice and only when sufficient criteria would be 
developed through its case law, as was also the case with the principle of proportionality, 
would it be reasonable to transfer this competence to national courts. 
 
Considering all the arguments in favour and against the application of the de minimis rule to 
the field of the internal market it may be concluded that this rule probably presents the least 
worrisome contribution of the EU Court of Justice (and the Commission) towards the 
decentralisation of the internal market regulation and the increase of its legitimacy. Any 
other demands made by the Member States for the enhancement of their autonomy as 
market regulators would probably have much greater consequences for the effectiveness of 
the internal market. 
 
